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COMMENT ON "SOME ESSAYS AT OBJECTIVITY" 
by 
George Kateb 
Winch's book is difficult and too brief for its purposes; and I have little 
confidence in my ability to sound it to its depths. Still, I feel enough confidence 
to say that Professor Rudner has not responded, with the right amount of 
directness, to its challenge. The idea of a Social Science is a challenge. It is an 
upsetting experience not only for those who advocate the scientific method as 
the sole road to understanding, and scientific understanding as the sole kind of 
understanding, but also for those who, more modestly, cherish reason or 
rationality. Winch threatens to dissolve the world into an aggregate of mutually 
uncomprehending and disconnected parts. He insists on-he seems to delight in­
the autonomy of disciplines, activities, stations of life, ways of life, cultures, and 
more besides. In my judgment, he goes too far in his book. In his long review­
essay on Rush Rhees's Without Answers (Ratio, June, 1972) he goes even farther 
in denying the possibility of a "common measure of human understanding" as 
between disciplines, activities, cultures, and so on. ("The illusion of a common 
measure of understanding is one to which men have always been subject and is 
something most philosophers have had to grapple with." pp. 89-90.) I share 
Professor Rudner's unease -in the face of a threatened anarchy of unintelli­
gibility. That is Winch's thought carried to its extreme. Short of that, Winch is 
saying, saying and implying, someihing that must be met squarely, and without 
anxiety concerning its extreme extension. We must allow for.the likelihood that, 
as I say, he goes too far; and then see his point, and maybe save it from him. 
What I miss in Professor Rudner's strong paper is just this head-on confronta­
tion with what is for me Winch's main contention, his point. If l understand it 
right it is that we cannot explain human conduct by reference to laws expressing 
invariantly regular relationships between the human being and his environment. 
The reason is that there is no universal human being just as there is no universal 
environment. There are cultures in their plurality and changeability; that is, there 
are configurations of various conventions, rules, procedures, beliefs, practices, 
habits, customs, mores, and manners which constitute human beings, so to 
speak, by constituting the environment into which human beings are born and 
in which they are raised and become participants. We must perceive human con­
duct only as conduct of culturally formed human beings living with each other in 
a common culture or way of life. We can explain such conduct only by reference 
to particular conventions, rules, or whatever. Answers to the questions, What is 
he or she (or what are they) doing? and Why is he or she (or why are they) doing 
that? are not expressible in a universal language, or reducible to illustrations of 
universal laws. Human nature (which Winch does not think exists) cannot ac­
count for human conduct in society. To let Winch speak for himself: 
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Historical explanation is not lhe application of generalizations and theories 
to particular instances: it is the tracing of internal relations. It is like applying 
one's knowledge of a language in order to understand a conversation rather 
than like applying one's knowledge of lhe laws of mechanics to understand 
the workings of a watch. (p. 133) 
I think t.hat Winch's critique of physical science as a model for social science 
is, above everything else, a critique of the desire to discover laws that state 
invariant regularities about human ·nature: non-cullurally-determined human 
responses to non-culturally-specified conditions. If Winch is right, or at least 
more right than wrong, he has worked a profound conceptual reformation. He is 
presenling an argument on the aim of social inquiry. He wants to disallow, as 
philosophically untenable, the aim of creating a science of human behavior 
which will consist of a body of law-like propositions that. will make prediction 
possible one day, and that will have additions and refinements as time goes 
on-a progressive and applicable science. 
My major complaint is that Professor Rudner has not made the central issue 
central to his paper. He has instead taken up two themes which are, of course, 
seriously implicaled in any discussion of Winch, but only one of which even 
touches on the central issue. Professor Rudner's stress is on methods appro­
priate to social inquiry. Before one deals with Winch on the methods, however, 
one must try to determine whether Winch is right on the aim of social inquiry. 
The basic question is-to put it a little differently this time-In aim, is the study 
of man like the study of a substance and its properties, or of bodies in motion, 
or of a plant and how it grows, or of an animal species and its habits, or of a 
machine and its working? Or is it what Winch says it is and must be; or i f  not 
exactly as he says, th.en significantly closer to his conception than to the 
scientific model suggested by my mention of substance, plants, animals, and 
machines? Is its aim like the aim of one who wishes to be taught a game or a 
language, or to understand and interpret a work of art? Is every culture a world 
for which the concepts and categories suitable to another are most probably not 
going to be suitable to it.? Must it be taken on its own terms? Have we left the 
notion of causality as physical science uses it when we say, for example, that a 
person's conduct is caused by (determined by) a reason having to do with follow­
ing a convention or a code, or performing in a ritual or a ceremony, or behaving 
in conformity wilh the expectations adhering to role or place, or making a 
successful move or play in a game or sport, or choosing a word or phrase for 
its felicity or power or precision? Is such conduct though caused in some sense 
not caused in the prevailing sense among physical scientists? 
I cannot answer Winch's central question and the questions that follow in­
evitably in its train. I only have suspicions: they are favorable to Winch's case. 
Speech creates human consciousness; consciousness creates distinctions of good 
and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, done and not done, correct and in­
correct, bright and stupid, and so on. These distinctions cut humanity off from 
the natural and lhe mechanical. Man is an artificial creature: invarienl regulari­
ties do not pertain to artifice. Man follows rules and forms and habits: these are 
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his regularities; but they are not naturally necessary responses to given condi­
tions. What is involved is not freedom of will but something else which I cannot 
name-some terrifying and universal capacity to be shaped in almost any way, 
and still to modify shapes over time. All I can do is point back to Book I of 
Aristotle's Politics, and realize that Winch, with the help of Wittgenstein and 
Collingwood, is maintaining a tradition of thought. 
He does go too far: that is also among my suspicions. I want to try to reserve 
some place for human commonality, whether it be universal needs, or drives, or 
passions, or feelings, or gross vices and clear virtues. I want to believe that the 
phrase "human condition" refers to permanent human ineluctabilities which 
make up a substratum, a common underlying human nature. I would like to be 
able to see some aspects of any culture as peculiar forms that express or hide or 
sublimate or symbolize needs or feelings or whatever that exist elsewhere in 
different forms, but that everywhere precede all forms. I am sympathetic to 
Pareto's enterprise, sharply rejecting of. it though Winch is. At the same time, I 
continue to think-and I hope that this is not a self-serving delusion-that I can 
speak of permanent human ineluctabilities and yet not accept the aim of 
physical science as the aim of social inquiry. 
I would say that Professor Rudner's paper provides solid help not in saving 
the scientific aim of social inquiry but in weakening Winch's attempt to rule out 
certain methods as irrelevant to social inquiry. If Professor Rudner can show 
that Winch has exaggerated the difficulties inherent in understanding human life 
in society, he has prepared the way for avoiding the "threatened anarchy of 
unintelligibility." I think that Professor Rudner is right in a number of argu­
ments he presents in the course of dealing with two themes in Winch. But there 
is an irony: if Professor Rudner is right, he has not served his own intention. He 
has not saved scientific methods (any more than he has saved scientific aims) for 
social inquiry. Rather, he has helped the cause of common sense which, as I 
suppose, would resist Winch's determined effort to conceive of each culture as 
self-enclosed and also almost wholly closed to an outsider's comprehension. 
Winch's view is ultra-anthropological; it indicates belief in the socio-centric 
predicament. Professor Rudner goes some way in weakening Winch's view. 
Much of social reality is invisible. It is made up of, among other things, what 
people are thinking and dreaming and being led or driven by inwardly; the un­
spoken; the silent determination of conventions and rules and forms; the un­
conscious and barely conscious; the mediations of memory and anticipation; and 
so on. These are the elements of hidden mind and of meaningful conduct. Even 
in one's own society the job of understanding what is done and why it is done is 
often-I do not think I overstate-hard and often impossible .. Even in one's ow� 
society one must be resourceful to gain a mere rough approximation of under­
standing. One must use and lend and extend and restrain oneself. Hobbes said, 
"Read thyself." One must practice introspection; one must be willing to argue 
from analogous cases; one must re-enact a.nd "put on" new men and women; 
one must fumble over the right words to employ in analysis and judgment; one 
must "read" a situation; one is forced to infer and conjecture and follow one's 
hunches; one must interpret. One must be prepared to be surprised. All these 
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things are done without any sure expectation of successful understanding. 
The image of the arduousness of understanding one's society is the arduous­
ness of self-understanding. But one goes on trying to have as much of both as 
possible. By extension, it is usually harder for the self to understand the other 
than itself, usually harder to understand another society than one's own. I do 
not know whether the morality of social inquiry resides in tht: will to discover 
ourselves in others and others in ourselves, or in the will to acknowledge and 
respect otherness. In any case, I do not see how we can consider these methods 
the methods of science; that is, the methods by which we characterize scientific 
inquiry, the methods of neutral observation from the outside of that which lacks 
the elements of hidden mind and meaningful conduct. It is finally the imagina­
tion which is the source of psychological and social understanding-not in the 
sense of imagination as it js shown by great scientists but in the sense shown by 
great writers. The aim of social inquiry is to get inside: to get inside a mind or an 
act or a situation or an event; or a code or a set of rules or the habits of"a voca­
tion or-miraculously-a culture as a whole. The aim is to get the point. Of 
course, knowledge sustains the work of the imagination; the work is unthinkabJe 
without knowledge. The knowledge is knowledge of countless particulars, of 
numerous concepts; and the tentative half-knowledge of human commonality: 
such knowledge we generally name "wisdom." But the knowledge is not of 
universal laws; the methods cannot be those that are part of the pursuit of 
universal laws. 
At the same time, imagination, in its full powers, may climb over the walls 
Winch thinks are there; if not all the walls, then some, perhaps many. Professor 
Rudner seems to be right, in his treatment of the first theme, when he criticizes 
Winch for a species of "the reproductive fallacy." You do not have to be a 
Catholic to understand Catholicism. (Else how could anyone ever possibly 
convert? How could one go from ignorance or hostility to an informed and 
passionate acceptance?) It helps to have some experience of Western religion. 
But surely a non-Catholic can imagine, say, the power exerted by the ritual on a 
believer, the solace of dogma, the thrill of engagement in a tradition nearly 
two millennia old, the esthetic or psychological satisfaction of the view of 
redemption, and so on. A non-believer, by definition, does not have the ex­
perience of belief, and the deepened understanding of Catholicism that belief 
may grant a first-rate mind. He can still go part of the way. Imagination permits 
penetration of otherness; it may even permit otherness to penetrate. But 
imagination �ustained by the sorts of knowledge just mentioned is not any 
version of the scientific method. 
I am also sympathetic to Professor Rudner's views on translatability. I wish, 
however, that he had not chosen the paradigm of verbal translation; translating 
nouns of one language into those of another; but had instead discussed Pareto's 
enterprise, dismissed by Winch. The enterprise consists in finding similarity of 
human intention underneath forms that differ from culture to culture, or from 
time to time in the same culture. Winch posits a world in which intention cannot 
exist apart from a rule of convention, and a rule or convention cannot exist apart 
from a whole set or system of rules or conventions. No single thing can be 
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detached from the ensemble and be examined for its likeness lo a superficially 
similar thing detached from another ensemble. Pareto compares the use of pagan 
lustral water and that of Christian baptismal water. All lhat Winch sees in the 
comparison is similar physical movements, and they do not prove similar human 
intention or yield the same cultural meaning. Doubtless Pareto's method levels, 
indeed crushes meaning; in its parodic execution it shows and spreads a base 
cynicism. For all that, water cleans. May there not be a widespread connection 
between dirt and moral impurity, and hence a widespread sacramental use of 
water? There is no flat assertion here, no claim to universality, no insistence 
that the sacramental use of water llfusttates a necessity of human nature. lt 
seems to me that some less pretentious handling of Pareto's purpose than 
Pareto's own would be valjd and promote a sense of human relatedness. On 
this score, I think Professo·r Rudner's instincts are right; and perhaps his pro­
cedure, too. But to say that iis not to make any concession to the proponents of 
the scientific method in social inquiry. Comparing conventions of different 
cultures is not practicing science; it is much more like comparing people or 
paintings. 
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